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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES V. BALTIMORE*
A PROSECUTION UNDER THE DMCA
1. INTRODUCTION
This action arises out of a program created by a Calculating Institute
of Technology ("Caltech") student which disables technology used to
protect copyrighted digital media. The Government filed charges against
Caltech, Caltech student John Johnson, Caltech president Daniel Baltimore,
and Caltech professor Sundance Law, alleging violations of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). See 17 U.S.C. § 1204.'
Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the
indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B).
For the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS Defendants' motion
as to Defendant Caltech, but DENIES the motion as to all other
Defendants.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Caltech is a private university at which Defendant Sundance Law is a
professor. In the fall of 2003, Defendant Law divided his Caltech students
into teams of two for an encryption/decryption exercise. Within each team,
he assigned one student the task of designing a technological protection
This is a mock opinion that has no affiliation with the United States District Court or any other court.
As such, it has no legal effect nor does it purport to represent legal precedent at any time; past, present,
or future. Therefore, the legal citations and views expressed herein should in no way be relied upon or
cited to as legal authority.
1. Section 1204 states, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who violates section 1201 or
1202 willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain" shall be
subject to fines, imprisonment, or both. However, this "shall not apply to a nonprofit library,
archives, educational institution, or public broadcasting entity."
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measure, such as a digital content encryption program, and assigned the
other to decrypt the first student's creation. Students posted their
encryption and decryption programs on a publicly accessible course
website for comment and testing by other students. One student developed
an anti-copying system that employed two encryption methods: content
encryption and copy control information. Together, these methods created
a process called Digital Rights Management ("DRM") that limits and
manages the rights associated with using the underlying media content.
Defendant John Johnson, the second student in this dyad, was
assigned the task of defeating this program. Johnson's decryption program
circumvented both encryption measures, rendering the underlying content
completely accessible for copying, distribution, and playback. Johnson's
program employed repetitive trial and error techniques (known colloquially
as "brute force") to discover the keys needed to bypass the anti-copying
system. This technique required significant computing power, which
Johnson's program accessed by linking together a web of computers over
the Internet. Johnson uploaded his program to the class website and sent
Caltech students a request for them to cooperate by linking their computers
together. Using this method, Johnson defeated the encryption program
within twenty-four hours. Johnson then posted the decryption key and his
resum6 on the class website.
Professor Law realized that the encryption program Johnson defeated
was similar to the 5C Digital Transmission Content Protection ("DTCP")
technology that some entertainment and consumer electronics companies
use to protect commercially distributed audio and video entertainment
works. Law tested Johnson's decryption program on DTCP technology by
posting a few seconds of a DTCP-encrypted video clip on Johnson's
website. The program found the decryption key within a day. Law posted
additional video clips on the website and each was successfully decrypted.
Since that time, many others throughout the country have accessed this
public website and used Johnson's program to obtain decryption keys to
circumvent the technology protecting digital media.
The United States Department of Justice brought criminal charges
against Johnson, Law, Caltech, and its president, Daniel Baltimore, for
violations of the DMCA. The Government alleged that each Defendant,
acting willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain, violated the DMCA's circumvention and anti-trafficking
measures. Caltech, Baltimore, and Law were also indicted for aiding and
abetting Johnson.
Defendants move to dismiss the indictment on several grounds. First,
all Defendants have moved to dismiss the indictment because the DTCP
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technology does not "effectively protect" digital content, and thus, does not
fall within the meaning of the DMCA. Second, the Defendants also argue
that the DMCA unconstitutionally restricts their speech violating their First
Amendment rights. Third, Caltech, Baltimore, and Law claim they are
neither directly nor vicariously liable for Johnson's conduct. Finally,
Caltech claims statutory immunity as an educational institution. The Court
rejects all of the Defendants' arguments except for Caltech's claim of
statutory immunity.
III. DIscussIoN
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) permits defendants to
move for dismissal of an indictment on the grounds that it "fails to invoke
the court's jurisdiction or to state an offense." A motion to dismiss the
indictment must be tested by its sufficiency to charge an offense. United
States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1962). The indictment is sufficient
if it "contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a
defendant of the charge against which he must defend." Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974). A motion to dismiss is "'capable of
determination' before trial if it involves questions of law rather than fact."
United States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir.
1986). But the court may determine factual issues that do not "determin[e]
the validity of the defense." Id.
A. Caltech Is an Educational Institution, Exempt from Prosecution
Subsection 1204(a) of the DMCA criminal statute states that it "shall
not apply to a[n] ... educational institution." The parties do not dispute
that Caltech is an educational institution. However, the Government
contends that when Caltech allegedly violated the DMCA, it did not act as
an educational institution, and thus, waived its statutory immunity. This
interpretation converts Congress' grant of immunity into mere surplusage
because the grant could never shield an educational institution from
prosecution. Because "[i]t is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible,
to every clause and word of a statute," this Court must assume that
Congress meant what it plainly said. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883). Therefore, Caltech is exempt from this criminal statute and the
motion to dismiss as to Defendant Caltech is GRANTED.
B. The DTCP Technology Is Effective Within the Meaning of the DMCA
The DMCA only prohibits circumventing "effective" technology-
2004]
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technology that "effectively controls access to a [copyrightable] work."
2
The statutory definition indicates that a technological measure does not
need to make circumvention impossible to be effective. If that measure,
"in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work," then it is effective. 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(3)(B). The statute does not specify the quantity or quality of
information, processes, or treatments required to be effective. Thus, even
the application of minimal technological measures may be considered
"effective" under the statute.
But the encryption technology circumvented here requires much more
than the application of minimal technological measures. In order to
circumvent this technology, a person would need: (1) the technical
knowledge and skill to access and use a distributed computing system; (2)
the patience to repeatedly subject two minute clips of video to the
decryption system and wait almost a day to obtain each key; 3 and (3) the
additional technical ability to splice these clips back together to form the
full work. The DTCP encryption prevents access to all except a few skilled
people that would have to work for weeks to decrypt a single motion
picture on DVD. This effort meets the statutory requirement that, in the
ordinary course of its operation, the work cannot be accessed without
applying some information, process, or treatment supplied by the copyright
owner.
The Defendants urge the Court to adopt a more narrow reading of the
word "effective." They argue that effective measures must, at minimum,
operate reasonably to control access to copyrightable material. However,
even if the Court adopted this more narrow reading, DTCP would still be
effective. Because unreasonable and extraordinary efforts are required to
bypass the protection system, DTCP technology is therefore "effective"
within the meaning of the DMCA.
C. The Indictment Sufficiently Alleges that Defendants Acted Willfully and
for Purposes of Commercial Advantage or Private Financial Gain
Defendants argue they lacked the requisite state of mind for criminal
sanctions. Section 1204 limits criminal liability to those persons that
2. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2000).
3. Commercial users of 5C DTCP encryption generally divide the underlying digital content
into short segments, each requiring a different decryption key. To fully decrypt a work such as a
movie, an individual would have to discover keys for each segment and then edit the decoded
segments together.
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"violate[] section 1201 or 1202 willfully and for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain." At this pre-trial stage of the
proceedings, the Government need only demonstrate that it sufficiently
charged the offense. Sampson, 371 U.S. at 78-79. The offenses are
sufficiently charged if the Government alleges each of "the elements of the
offense charged [in a manner that] fairly informs [each] defendant of the
charge against which he must defend." Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117. Thus, in
this case, the Government is required to sufficiently charge that
Defendants' conduct was (1) willful and (2) for the purposes of commerical
advantage or private financial gain.
1. The Government has sufficiently charged that Defendants' conduct was
willful
The Copyright Act does not define willfulness. The Supreme Court
has recognized that willful is "a word of many meanings, its construction
often being influenced by its context." Spies v. United States, 317 U.S.
492, 497 (1943). To establish willfulness in this context, the Government
must allege (1) that each Defendant knew Johnson's program could decrypt
media protected by DTCP technology in violation of the DMCA; (2) that
each Defendant knew the program was posted on a public website; and (3)
that each Defendant could have removed the program after learning the
information above but failed to do so.4 The Government sufficiently states
these allegations. It alleges that the Department of Justice notified all
Defendants that the program posted on Caltech's public website was
capable of circumventing DTCP technology, and that the Defendants
refused to remove the program although each was capable of doing so.
Therefore, willfulness was alleged sufficiently as to all Defendants.
4. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
defendant acted willfully by continuing to distribute infringing copies of motion pictures after
film studios sued him for such conduct); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167
F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding, in denying a motion to dismiss, that plaintiff
had sufficiently plead criminal willfulness by alleging that the defendant Cybernet was "aware
that the copying [by its affiliated websites was] copyright infringement," that Cybemet knew
what its affiliates were doing, and "that Cybernet ha[d] actual notice that Perfect 10 did not give
these websites permission to use Perfect 10's images"); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.14 (2004) (stating that § 1204 requires "the
traditional two elements to render copyright depredations criminal: acting 'willfully and for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain."').
2004]
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2. The Government has sufficiently charged that Defendants acted for
commerical advantage or private financial gain
The Government must also allege defendants acted for commercial
advantage or private financial gain. 17 U.S.C. § 1204. The Copyright
Act's definition of financial gain "includes receipt, or expectation of
receipt, of anything of value," including future revenue. 17 U.S.C. § 101;
see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc;, 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir.
2001) (extending the concept of financial gain to include the ability to
monetize Napster's Internet user-base at some future point).
The indictment states that Defendants maintained the decryption
program for commerical advantage or private financial gain. Specifically,
the indictment alleges that Defendant Johnson posted his resum6 alongside
his decryption program on the website, suggesting Johnson hoped to gain
employment from posting the program. As to the other Defendants, the
Government alleges that maintaining the decryption program on the
website has the potential to bring prestige to Professor Law, Caltech, and
thus, President Baltimore, from which all could profit. These facts are
sufficient to allege that Defendants Law and Baltimore acted for purposes
of private financial gain.
D. Law and Baltimore's Third-Party Liability
The federal aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), states that
anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" a
federal crime "is punishable as a principal." The statute is "applicable to
all federal criminal offenses," and thus, is applicable to the DMCA's
criminal statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1204. Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994). "The statute decrees that those who
provide knowing aid to persons committing federal crimes, with the intent
to facilitate the crime, are themselves committing a crime." Id.
The Supreme Court has defined criminal aiding and abetting liability
as requiring "proof that the Defendant 'in some sort associated himself with
the venture, that he participated in it as in something that he wished to
bring about, that he sought by his action to make it succeed."' Id. at 190
(quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)). Thus,
the Government's indictment of Law and Baltimore must allege that the
two knowingly associated themselves with Johnson's alleged venture to
violate the DMCA and acted to help the venture succeed. The indictment
sufficiently alleges these elements, stating that Law and Baltimore
"willfully participated in creating and maintaining a computer program to
[violate the DMCA] for commercial advantage and financial gain."
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Prosecution's Opposition Brief at 11. This allegation is sufficient to
withstand the motion to dismiss as it contains all of the elements of the
offense and fairly informs the Defendants of the charge against which they
must defend. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117.
E. The DMCA Does Not Violate the First Amendment
Finally, Defendants claim that the DMCA is a content-based
restriction on speech that violates the First Amendment rights of educators
and is therefore unconstitutional. Two other district courts in this circuit
have heard similar arguments and determined that the DMCA is a content-
neutral regulation that does not "burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to achieve the government's asserted goals of promoting
electronic commerce, protecting copyrights, and preventing electronic
piracy." United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1132 (N.D.
Cal. 2002); accord 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("[T]his Court finds that the challenged
provisions further important and substantial government interests unrelated
to the suppression of free expression, and that the incidental restrictions on
First Amendment freedoms are no greater than essential to the furtherance
of those interests.").
The only new wrinkle added to the Defendants' motion to dismiss is
their claim that the Government violated the First Amendment by offering
to drop criminal charges if Caltech: (1) removed the decryption program
from its website, and (2) stopped teaching decryption. The Defendants
maintain that the Government's attempt to restrict Caltech's curriculum is
clearly unconstitutional. While their argument has merit, it is nonetheless
irrelevant to the indictment. Whether the Government's offer was a
request, a negotiation, or an order, their indictment was careful not to allege
that Caltech's subsequent refusal to stop teaching decryption was an
element of the violation of §§ 1201 or 1204. Since the indictment
completely relies on the act of knowingly maintaining the decryption
program on Caltech's website, the First Amendment was not violated.
Further, Congress tailored the DMCA more narrowly for educational
institutions and endeavors than for software distributors such as 321
Studios or Elcom Ltd. The DMCA includes several provisions that provide
exemptions for educational purposes. The criminal statute, § 1204(b),
exempts all educational institutions for violations of §§ 1201 or 1202.
Under certain conditions, § 1201 exempts educational institutions and
persons working in encryption research. In fact, Johnson, Law, and
Baltimore may have qualified for the encryption research exemption had
2004]
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they "made a good faith effort to obtain authorization before the
circumvention." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2)(C). These statutory provisions
show that, as to educational purposes, Congress tailored the DMCA more
narrowly, decreasing burdens on academic freedom.
Therefore, in this academic setting, enforcement of the DMCA did
not violate Defendants' First Amendment rights were not violated.
IV. CONCLUSION
A court cannot grant a motion to dismiss criminal charges unless the
indictment fails to invoke the court's jurisdiction or fails to allege the
elements of the offense. As to Caltech, an educational institution, the
DMCA plainly exempts it from prosecution and its motion is GRANTED.
However, the Government's indictments of Johnson, Law, and Baltimore
contain each of the elements required to state an offense. The Court,
therefore, DENIES Defendants Johnson, Law, and Baltimore's motions to
dismiss.
Ronald S. W. Lew
United States District Judge
Law Clerks: Phillip Stuller and Toby Huang
